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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-MIRANDA WARN
INGS NOT REQUIRED WHERE THERE Is No OBJECTIVE DETER
MINATION OF "CUSTODY": EFFECT OF SUSPECT'S PAROLEE STAT
US.

Oregon v. Mathiason, 429

U.S.

492 (1977).

Carl Mathiason, a parolee under supervlSlon, became impli
cated in a burglary.1 An Oregon police officer tried three or four
times unsuccessfully to contact Mathiason and eventually left his
card at Mathiason's apartment with a note asking him to call.
Mathiason contacted the officer and a meeting was arranged at a
"convenient" location, the state patrol office. 2 Soon after his arrival,
Mathiason was taken into an office, the door was closed and he was
informed that he was not under arrest. The officer advised the de
fendant that the police believed he was involved in a burglary and
falsely stated that his fingerprints were found at the scene. After a
few moments, Mathiason admitted that he had taken the property.
At that point the officer advised the defendant of his Miranda
rights 3 and took a taped confession. Mterwards Mathiason was
again informed that he was not under arrest and that the case
would be refc-rred to the district attorney for a determination of
whether charges would be brought. 4 Mathiason left the patrol of
fice approximately one-half hour after he had arrived.
The defendant was convicted of first degree burglary. At the
trial he moved to suppress his confession, arguing that it was the
result of a custodial police interrogation not preceded by the re

1. An officer of the Oregon State Police, while investigating a theft, asked the
burglary victim if she suspected anyone. She replied that Carl Mathiason, a parolee
and a "close associate" of her son, was the only one she could imagine. 429 U.S. at
~3.
•
2. The building housed several state agencies and was located about two blocks
from Mathiason's apartment. Mathias~n had expressed no preference as to where the
meeting should take place. Id.
3. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), the Supreme Court held
that prior to an in-custody police interrogation the suspect must be informed that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, that he
has the right to have an attorney present during interrogation, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him at government expense. See text
accompanying notes 9-12 infra.
4. The officer gave all testimony relevant to this issue. The defendant did not
take the stand either at the hearing on the motion to suppress or at the trial. 429 U.S.
at 494.
189
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quired Miranda warnings. 5 The trial court denied the motion be
cause it found that Mathiason was not in custody at the time of his
confession. The state's intermediate appellate court unanimously af
firmed. 6 The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed and remanded 7
holding that, although Mathiason had not been arrested or other
wise formally detained, the interrogation took place in a "coercive
environment" of the sort to which Miranda was intended to apply.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and by a di
vided opinion again reversed. 8 In a per curiam disposition the
Court held that Miranda warnings are required only where there
has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him
"in custody."
In Miranda v. Arizona 9 the Supreme Court set forth the rules
of police procedure applicable to police interrogation. In a "custo
dial interrogation" situation, where the suspect is in custody at
the time of the questioning, certain procedural safeguards are
employed to protect the rights of the accused. 10 The most difficult
issue raised by Miranda is the determination of the particular point
at which the warnings are required. l1 This issue of precisely when
5. It should be noted that the defendant's formal taped confession was pre
ceded by the required warnings. However, his initial admission of guilt was elicited
by police interrogation before the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights. The
attempt to exclude all of the admissions flowing from the initial allegedly improper
police interrogation is an application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
which calls for the exclusion of all evidence derived from a constitutional violation.
See United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971) (applying "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine to evidence obtained from a Miranda violation).
6. 22 Or. App. 494, 539 P.2d 1122 (1975).
7. 275 Or. 1,549 P.2d 673 (1976).
8. 429 U.S. 492 (1977). Justice Marshall dissented on the merits; Justice Bren
nan and Justice Stevens dissented from the summary disposition.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. See note 3 supra. The basic aim of Miranda is to secure the individual's
privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444. It has been commented that
Miranda was intended to overcome the dangers inherent in a police station interro
gation by achieving the following four general goals: (1) Overcome the compelling
atmosphere of the interrogation; (2) overcome the more sophisticated pressures on
the individual to speak; (3) eliminate real or supposed police abuses in the course of
interrogation; and (4) protect the evidentiary value of confessions or inculpatory
statements by ensuring their voluntary nature. Smith, The Threshold Question In
Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C. L. REV. 699,
700-02 (1974).
11. "[Tlhe true difficulty with the warning requirement is simply the lack of a
clear and properly restricted description of those situations in which the warnings
must be given." Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the
Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1320, 1384 (1977) (footnote omitted).
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a "custodial interrogation" exists has been a source of prolific liti
gation. 12
The history of Mathiason exemplifies the continuing confusion
over the issue of custodial interrogation. The Oregon Supreme
Court in a divided opinion (4-3) reversed its Court of Appeals on
this issue, and subsequently was itself reversed by a similarly di
vided (6-3) United States Supreme Court. 13 It is obvious that
reasonable people differ in their opinions of what constitutes "cus
todial interrogation" for Miranda purposes. Mathiason also raises
the issue of the effect of a suspect's parolee status upon the deter
mination of whether a given set of circumstances amounts to "cus
tody. "14 This note will examine the test the Supreme Court used to
define "custodial interrogation," and whether the Court's treatment
of the "parolee status" issue is consistent with this test.
The Supreme Court in Miranda defined "custodial interroga
tion" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. "15 In its most recent
consideration of the application of Miranda prior to Mathiason,
Beckwith v. United States,16 the Court stressed that the crucial
issue in determining precisely when there has been a "significant"
deprivation of freedom of action is the custodial nature of the inter
rogation. The Beckwith Court held that Miranda warnings were not
required before two IRS agents questioned an individual at his
home when there was no finding of custodial circumstances. 17

12. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); People v. Wilson, 268 Cal. App. 2d
581, 74 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1968); Doe v. Chang, 58 Haw. Adv. Sh. No. 6261, 564 P.2d
1271 (1977); State v. Love, 546 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. App. 1977); People v. Allen, 28 App.
Div. 2d 724, 281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967). See Smith, supra note 10. See generally Annot.,
31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).
13. See notes 7 & 8 supra.
14. Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Mathiason, expressed the view that the
parole status of the suspect at the time of the interrogation was a fact of particular
importance, but that it might lend support to inconsistent conclusions. One possible
conclusion is that since the state has greater power to question a parolee about his
activities than it does an ordinary individual the warnings may not be required. The
other is that since the parolee remains technically in legal custody, on a formal cus
tody analysis he or she should always be warned. 429 U.S. at 499-500. See text ac
companying notes 95-96 infra.
15. 384 U.S. at 444.
16. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
17. The Court viewed the narrow issue dealt with by the Miranda Court as
"'the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to
custodial police interrogation.''' 425 U.S. at 345 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384
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The vague definition of "custodial interrogation" given in
Miranda has required lower federal and state courts to decide on a
case-by-case basis whether a particular suspect was "in custody"
when interrogated. 18 Almost all of these courts agree that the de
tennination of custodial interrogation must be made after consider
ation of the totality of the circumstances. 19 The most important
circumstances identified by the courts as bearing on the deter
mination of "custodial interrogation" have been classified under the
following general headings: (1) "The nature of the interrogator;" (2)
"the nature of the suspect;" (3) "the time and place of the interro
gation;" (4) "the nature of the interrogation;" and (5) "the progress
of the investigation at the time of the interrogation. "20 No one cir
cumstance or set of circumstances has been held conclusive. 21 The
decision whether a particular suspect was "in custody" at the time
of interrogation will generally turn on the particular test used by
the court to determine whether the suspect has been deprived of
his or her freedom of action in a significant way. One commentator
has grouped the tests which the courts use into three general clas
sifications: (1) The focus test; (2) the subjective test; and (3) the
objective test. 22
The focus test centers on the extent to which the investigation
has concen trated on the particular suspect. 23 It is an extension of
U.S. 436, 439 (1966)). The Court cited Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), and
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), with approval, stating "the Court specifically
stressed that it was the custodial nature of the interrogation which triggered the ne
cessity for adherence to the specific requirements of its Miranda holding." 425 U.S. at
346. See note 49 infra. The Court noted that under some circumstances a noncustodial
interrogation might have coercive aspects, but it indicated that this would only go to
the ultimate issue of voluntariness and not to the issue of custody. 425 U.S. at 347.
18. E.g., United States v. Akin, 435 F.2d 1011, 1012 (5th CiT. 1970), cert. de
nied, 401 U.S. 1011 (1971) ("Because of the difficulty offormulating a precise defini
tion of 'custodial interrogation' this Court takes a 'case-by-case' approach to resolving
question of custodial interrogation."); United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373, 376
(4th CiT. 1968) ("Precise refinements of the terms 'custody' and 'interrogation' will
have to be developed on a case-by-case basis."); State v. McLain, 367 A.2d 213, 220
(Me. 1976) ("[TJhe court must examine the facts of each particular case to determine
whether the line between general investigation and custodial interrogation has been
crossed."); Burton v. State, 32 Md. App. 529, 533, 363 A.2d 243, 246 (1976) ("The
concept of custody, for applying the Miranda rule, must be determined on a case
to-case basis.").
19. E.g., United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State v.
Lewis, 373 A.2d 603 (Me. 1977); State v. Williams, 522 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. App. 1975).
20. Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 577 (1970).
21. See generally id.
22. Smith, supra note 10, at 707.
23. See United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373 (4th CiT. 1968); United States v.
Mendoza-Torres, 285 F. Supp. 629 (D. Ariz. 1968); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423
Pa. 541,226 A.2d 765 (1967).
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the Supreme Court's rationale in Escobedo v. Illinois. 24 There it
was held that certain rights attach when the "investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect. ... "25 This test, always of question
able validity when used by itself to determine whether a suspect is
"in custody, "26 has recently been expressly rejected by the Su
preme Court in Beckwith v. United States. 27
Under the subjective test the court asks whether the particular
individual being interrogated believed that he was in custody.28
The logic of the subjective test is clear. "[T]he person who honestly
but unreasonably thinks he is under arrest has been subjected to
precisely the same custodial pressures as the person whose belief
in this regard is reasonable. "29 Most courts which have ostensibly
adopted the subjective test nevertheless usually make an objective
"reasonable belief" determination. 3o In the view of these courts, a
person's reasonable belief that he is in custody is equivalent to ac
tual custody for Miranda purposes. 31 However, the problems of
proof inherent in this test often compel courts to use an even more
objective standard. 32
24. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
25. Id. at 490.
26. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cerl. denied, 397 U.S.
990 (1970); Smith, supra note 10, at 707-10.
27. 425 U.S. 341 (1976). "Although the 'focus' of an investigation may indeed
have been on Beckwith at the time of the interview in the sense that it was his tax
liability which was under scrutiny, he hardly found himself in the custodial situation
described by the Miranda Court as the basis for its holding." Id. at 347.
28. See Hicks v. United States, 382 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (defendant's sub
jective belief of arrest is one factor to consider in determining applicability of
Miranda, but is not controlling).
29. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 105 (1968).
30. United States v. Irion, 482 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026
(1973); United States v. Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v.
Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971). See Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 § 6 (1970)
(collecting cases).
31. The validity of the rationale behind the "reasonable belief" test has been
widely recognized. "An accused's reasonable belief that he is in custody would ...
be equally coercive for the purpose of waiver of rights in making a statement as if he
were in actual custody." Milhouse v. State, 31 Md. App. 571, 579, 358 A.2d 262, 267
(1976). Justice Marshall, dissenting in Mathiason, indicated his preference for such a
test. "At the very least, if respondent entertained an objectively reasonable belief
that he was not free to leave during the questioning, then he was 'deprived of his
freedom of action in a significant way.' " 429 U.S. at 496 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). However, the subjective test has been expressly rejected
in some jurisdictions. See Freije v. United States, 408 F.2d 100 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 859 (1969).
32. Smith, supra note 10, at 714.
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The objective test inquires into the actual extent to which the
individual's freedom of action has been restrained. 33 The suspect's
subjective belief, even if it is reasonable, or the progress of the
investigation at the time of the interrogation, are immaterial. The
controlling consideration is the formal restraint upon the individu
al's freedom. Under this test the court evaluates the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation, searching for evidence that the sus
pect was not free to leave at will. 34 Courts in the majority of juris
dictions apply a purely objective test. 35
The test which a particular court chooses to apply reflects that
court's view of the underlying purpose of the Miranda decision.
There are two widely held views of Miranda. The first view is that
the custody requirement was established for the sake of administra
tive efficiency. It easily and clearly identifies the moment at which
a suspect's rights must be pointed out to him. 36 The second view is
that, because of increased concern for safeguarding the individual's
fifth amendment rights, full procedural safeguards must be made
available at any stage of an investigation that may be deemed coer
cive, whether or not it involves custody.37 A court that accepts the
first view of Miranda will apply a purely objective test that seeks to
determine if the warnings were given at the technically correct
stage of the investigation. A court that follows the second view will
apply a more subjective analysis to determine at what point the
coercive nature of the interrogation was sufficient to necessitate the
warnings. 38
The Supreme Court in Mathiason clearly applied the objective
test. In stressing that the defendant came voluntarily to the police
station, was informed that he was not under arrest, and freely left

33. See United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 990 (1970).
34. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the determina
tion of whether the defendant was "in custody" or otherwise deprived of his freedom
in some significant way must be made on an objective basis. "[I]n the absence of
actual arrest, something must be said or done by the authorities, either in their man
ner of approach or in the tone or extent of their questioning, which indicates that
they would not have heeded a request to depart or to allow the suspect to do so."
421 F.2d at 545.
35. See Smith, supra note 10, at 711.
36. Note, Extending Miranda to Administrative Investigations, 56 VA. L. REV.
690, 700-02 (1970).
37. Id.
38. These opposing viewpoints formed the basis of the split between the major
ity and the dissenters on the Supreme Court in the Mathis and Orozco decisions. See
note 49 infra.
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the police station at the end of the interview, the Court concluded
"[i]t is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in custody 'or
othelWise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.' "39 The Court rejected the notion that a "coercive environ
ment" of the type that would necessitate Miranda warnings could
be. found in a non-custody situation, stating that "Miranda warnings
are required only where there has been such a restriction on a
person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' It was that sort of
coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made
applicable, and to which it is limited. "40 The' Court criticized the
Supreme Court of Oregon for reading Miranda "too broadly"41 in
that it had based its decision solely on a finding of "coercive envi
ronment. "42 The Supreme Court stated firmly that a finding of
coercive environment alone is insufficient to trigger the need for
Miranda warnings absent an independent finding of actual cus
tody.43
In making its objective analysis, the Court declined to con
sider any possible subjective effects the coercive police tactics
might have had upon the suspect, although such tactics clearly con
tributed to the coercive nature of the interrogation and to the sus

39. 429 U.S. at 495. The Court quotes the general definition of "custodial inter
rogation" given in Miranda. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
40. 429 U.S. at 495.
41. [d. at 493.
42. The Supreme Court of Oregon has reasoned as follows:
We hold the interrogation took place in a "coercive environment." The
parties were in the offices of the State Police; they were alone behind closed
doors; the officer informed the defendant he was a suspect in a theft and
the authorities had evidence incriminating him in the crime; and the defen
dant was a parolee under supervision. We are of the opinion that this evi
dence is not overcome by the evidence that the defendant came to the office
in response to a request and was told he was not under arrest.
275 Or. 1, 5, 549 P.2d 673, 675 (1976).
43. In this regard, the Court stated:
[A] noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies
simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took
place in a "coercive environment." Any interview of one suspected of a .
crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of
the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which
may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But -police
officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom
they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply
because the questioning takes place in the station house, or hecause the
questioned person is one whom the police suspect.
429 U.S. at 495.. '
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pect's reasonable belief that he was not free to leave. 44 The ma
jority concluded that "[ w ]hatever relevance [the officer's false
statement about having discovered Mathiason's fingerprints at the
scene] may have to other issues in the case, it has nothing to do
with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the
Miranda rule. "45 Thus, by declining to consider the suspect's sub
jective belief, in addition to rejecting the element of "coercive
environment, "46 the Court has made application of Miranda de
pendent solely upon an objective determination of restraint on
freedom of movement.
The Court drew support for this conclusion primarily from
Mathis v. United States 47 and Orozco v. Texas. 48 In Mathis, the
Miranda principle was held applicable to questioning which took
place in a prison setting during a suspect's term of imprisonment
on a separate offense. In Orozco it was held that Miranda was
applicable to questioning which took place in a suspect's home after
he had been placed under arrest. In each instance the suspect of
the interrogation was in actual custody at the time of the question
ing. The custodial aspect of the interrogation, rather than its coer
cive atmosphere or the suspect's subjective belief, was stressed as
the primary basis for the holdings. 49 The Court in Mathiason,

44. See LaFave, supra note 29, and accompanying text.
45. 429 U.S. at 495-96.
46. See note 43 supra.
47. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
48. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
49. In Mathis the suspect was an inmate in a state prison when he was ques
tioned by an IRS agent about his tax returns. The Court held that the suspect was
entitled to Miranda warnings as tax investigations often lead to criminal prosecution
and the supect was in custody at the time of the questioning. The Court rejected the
government's contention that Miranda is applicable only to the questioning of one
who is in custody in connection with the very case under investigation:
There is no substance to such a distinction, and in effect it goes against the
whole purpose of the Miranda decision which was designed to give mean
ingful protection to Fifth Amendment rights. We find nothing in the
Miranda opinion which calls for a curtailment of the warnings to be given
per~:ms under interrogation by officers based on the reason why the person
is in custody.
391 U.S. at 4-5.
In Orozco the suspect was confronted by four police officers in his boarding
house at 4 a.m. and questioned about a recent homicide. The Court cited to Mathis
on the "custody" requirement and held that the suspect was entitled to Miranda warn
ings because of one officer's testimony that the suspect was under arrest and not free
to leave at the time of the questioning. 394 U.S. at 325.
Both of these decisions were handed down by a divided court. Justices Harlan,
Stewart, and White dissented in Mathis, and Justices Stewart and White dissented in

1978]

NOTES

197

however, gave little guidance as to precisely when the restrictions
on an individual's freedom of action are "significant" enough to
render him "in custody" for Miranda purposes when there is no
actual imprisonment or actual arrest. 50
Some critics have contended that Mathiason seriously restricts
the scope and applicability of Miranda. One commentator has
criticized the decision as a limitation of Miranda without a careful
analysis of the issues presented. 51 However, although clearly not
an expansion of Miranda, Mathiason is not the severe limitation
upon it that these critics contend. Rather, Mathiason is a clearer
enunciation of the proper standard for application of the Miranda
principle. 52 To be sure, the decision indicates a rejection of a sub
jective determination of custodial interrogation and also expressly

Orozco, with Justice Harlan concurring solely on the basis of stare decisis. The dis
senters in each case stressed the fact that Miranda was intended to guard against the
coercive, hostile, and forbidding atmosphere surrounding police station interrogation
and that no su~h coercive atmosphere was present in these instances. The majority
rejected this reasoning and stressed that it was only the "in custody" element of the
interrogation that triggered the need for Miranda warnings.
50. In his dissent in Mathiason, Justice Marshall indicated that the mere for
malities of arrest and imprisonment should not control application of Miranda safe
guards. "It is true that respondent was not formally placed under arrest, but surely
formalities alone cannot controL" 429 U.S. at 498.
51. Note, Miranda Warnings Need Not Be Given Where There Is No Indication

Of Actual Custody And Where The Defendant's Freedom to Depart Is Not In Fact
Restricted, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 334 (1977). This commentator viewed the Mathiason
Court's adoption of the "objectively determined custody" standard as a severe retrac
tion of the original Miranda holding. "[S]uch a retraction [of Miranda] ought to be
made via a reasoned policy analysis in the light of post-Miranda experience rather
than a per curiam opinion which plays substanceless semantic games." Id. at 353.
The Burger Court has frequently been criticized for substituting narrow, technical
interpretations of constitutional guarantees for the expansive interpretation of those
guarantees adopted by the Warren Court. Israel, supra note 11, at 1323. However,
after a comparison of the decisions handed down by the Warren and Burger Courts,
that commentator concludes that:
[T]he Burger Court decisions on police practices have restricted the scope of
various Warren Court rulings. Some of these restrictions, however, might
well have been accepted by the Warren Court if the appropriate factual situ
ations had been at issue before it. Also, the restrictions imposed so far have
related primarily to collateral matters that do not substantially affect the
practical impact of the major Warren Court decisions on police practices.
Id. at 1326.
52. Since Miranda was handed down in 1966 its application has been subject to
varying interpretations by lower courts resulting in such divergent concepts as the
"focus test," the "coercive environment test," and the "subjective-reasonable belief
test." See text accompanying notes 22-32 supra. In Mathiason the Court has drawn
the line on these divergent' views and indicated the proper scope for application of
the Miranda principle; that is, an objective determination of "custody."
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rejects the "coercive environment" test. 53 The analysis is narrowed
to an objective search for "custody." The result may arguably be a
modest limitation upon the scope of Miranda, 54 but the Court has
not altered the basic premise of that landmark case. 55 Every crimi
nal defendant is still to be afforded meaningful protection for his or
her fifth amendment rights.
Although it clarifies the proper application of Miranda, the de
cision must be criticized for its failure to address the issue raised
by the defendant's parolee status. A parolee under supervision who
is subjected to police station interrogation clearly is deprived of his
freedom of action significantly more than an ordinary individual
under those circumstances. 56 Nonetheless, the majority in Ma
thiason made no reference to the defendant'sparolee status in its
objective determination of "custodial interrogation. "57
There are three possible rationales for the decision to ignore
Mathiason's parolee status. The Supreme Court may have reasoned
that: (1) The parolee status of the suspect has no bearing upon
custody for Miranda purposes, (2) consideration of parolee status in
the custody determination will create difficult administrative prob
lems, or (3) recognition of the suspect's parolee status will raise
numerous related problems in other arguably custodial situations.
In order to adequately explore these three possible rationales for
the Court's treatment of this issue, it is necessary to understand
both the legal and practical nature of the parole system.
Parole is broadly defined as the release of an offender who has
served only a portion of his sentence in a jail or prison. 58 The
53. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
~
54. The decision reached in Mathiason is not a radical departure from the Su
preme Court's traditional application of the Miranda principle on the basis of cus
tody. One commentator has observed that "[tlhe Court's conclusion in Mathiason that
the suspect there had not been in 'custody' might well have been reached by the
members of the Miranda majority themselves." Israel, supra note 11, at 1375 (foot
note omitted).
55. Miranda was intended to safeguard the individual's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444.
56. See text accompanying notes 58-85 infra.
57. As the key to the objective determination of custody applied by the majority
is "deprivation of freedom of action," the parolee status of the suspect bears directly
upon custody and thus merits some consideration. See text accompanying note 39
supra. The Supreme Court of Oregon took this factor into consideration in making its
determination of "coercive environment." See note 42 supra. Justice Stevens noted
the importance of this factor in his dissent. See note 14 supra.
58. L. CARNEY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 154
(1977).

1978]

NOTES

199

parolee remains in the "constructive," "legal," or "continued"59
custody of the state. His activities are restricted and he is carefully
supervised by the authorities. If the parolee violates the terms of
the parole, he can be reincarcerated. 60
Courts and commentators have developed three distinct
theoretical bases for parole: the Grace theory, the Contract-Con
sent theory, and the Custody theory. 61 Under the Grace theory
parole is viewed as merely a privilege which the state has uncon
trolled discretion to revoke. 62 Proponents of the Contract-Consent
theory maintain that the parolee bargains to obtain a freedom qual
ifIed by certain imposed conditions. 63 Under the Custody theory

59. The use of such ambiguous terms as "constructive custody," "legal cus
tody," and "continued custody" make it difficult to precisely define the legal status
of the parolee. See note 66 infra.
60. L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 154.
61. H. ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 201-02
(1977); D. STANLEY, PRISONERS AMONG Us 1 (1976); L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at
142-43; Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 702, 704-16 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Parole].
62. Theon) of Grace-The basic premise of this theory is that the convicted
person has been denied his liberty in accordance with due process of law. See Fuller
v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899). The state has the right to require this indi
vidual to remain incarcerated for the full duration of the sentence. See In re Varner,
166 Ohio St. 340, 142 N.E.2d 846 (1957). By providing for an earlier release by
parole the state has acted ex gratia and has conferred no legally protected right to
remain at liberty. Brown v. Kearney, 355 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1966). Parole is therefore
a privilege and not a right. The parole board, under the theory of "uncontrolled
discretion," is beyond control of the courts and can return a parolee to prison with
out notice and without cause. State v. Horton, 31 Ala. App. 71, 14 So.2d 557, afI'd,
244 Ala. 594, 14 So.2d 561 (1943). See L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 142-43. The con
stitutional validity of the Grace theory is questionable, especially with respect to the
states' "uncontrolled discretion" to revoke. Some courts have held that a right to a
hearing before revocation of parole or probation is a fundamental requirement of due
process. Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 681, 32 So.2d 607 (1947); see generally Annot., 29
A.L.R.2d 1074 (1953). The Grace theory has been expressly repudiated with respect
to probation in Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969) and Hahn v.
Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970), cerl. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
63. Theory of Contract-Consent-This theory is founded on the same legal
philosophy as the Theory of Grace, which is that the state has the absolute option of
holding the convict in prison until the end of his term. See note 62 supra. Under this
theory restoration of liberty is viewed as a contractual matter. The state yields its
power to hold the convict for the duration of the sentence in consideration of the
convict's consent to be bound by any conditions which the state may impose. See
Lee v. Gough, 86 R.I. 23, 133 A.2d 779, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 874 (1957). The em
phasis here is that the prisoner is free to refuse parole; but once it is accepted he
or she is obligated to fulfill the imposed conditions. See L. CARl1IEY, supra note 58,
at 142-43. The major criticism of the Contract-Consent theory is that parole is not
actually a contract reached through bilateral bargaining. One commentator has noted
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the parolee is considered to remain in "constructive custody" while
concluding his sentence. 64 Under each of these theories the
parolee's status is ambiguous. The parolee is not placed squarely at
liberty or squarely in custody. The extent to which such terms as
"continued custody," "constructive custody" or "legal custody" can
be legally equated with actual physical custody is unclear. 65
From a practical standpoint, this lack of a clearly defined
status restricts the parolee's freedom by failing to delineate the
boundaries of permissible conduct. The parolee is not afforded the
constitutional rights of a free person, nor is he given the constitu
tional ,protections of an individual in custody.66 This places the

that the prisoner has an unequal bargaining position and cannot really determine the
conditions of his release. Parole, supra note 61, at 709. Further, the conditions of
parole may be changed without the parolee's consent, so long as no additional
punishment is imposed. Id. at 709 n.47.
64. Theory of Custody-The proponents of this theory deny that the parolee
has any liberty whatsoever. It is asserted that the parolee remains constantly in con
structive custody and is merely given the privilege of concluding the sentence in the
community. Bricker v. Michigan Parole Bd., 405 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich. 1975);
see L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 142-43. Under this theory the courts have held that
a parolee's station in the community is merely an extension of his prison cell be
cause he is still serving his sentence. People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297
P.2d 451 (1956) (held that a parole officer's arbitrary search of a parolee's rented
room was justified). This theory is the most widely accepted today, but it too has
flaws. The major difficulty is that although the parolee allegedly remains in "con
structive custody" his liberty may be recognized in some instances. For instance, if a
parolee commits a crime while on parole, the parolee will be found at liberty in
order to permit prosecution under the laws of another sovereign. E.g., Gilchrist v.
Overlade, 233 Ind. 569, 122 N.E.2d 93 (1954).
65. See note 59 supra. Trying to classify the parolee within the narrow defini
tion of either "liberty" or "custody" has been a major source of confusion. One
commentator has noted that:
[Tjhe legislatures have contributed much toward the muddy thought in this
area. . . . With one clause of the parole act the convict is placed at liberty,
and with another he is placed in custody.... "[Aj prisoner at liberty shall
be deemed to be still in the legal custody and under the control of the board"
is the constant refrain of state paroling statutes. With this uncertain legisla
tive mandate as their guide the courts have utilized the custody concept to
confine the parolee within ever-expanding prison walls.
Parole, supra note 61, at 711 (footnote omitted); L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 171.
66. Reliance on the narrow concepts of "liberty" and "custody" has forced the
courts to define the parolee as at liberty for certain purposes and in custody for
others, resulting in general uncertainty as to his actual status:
By the simple expedient of finding the parolee at liberty the courts have
managed to avoid a dangerous constitutional objection to the delegation of
"sentencing authority" to the board. But if the parolee relies on his being at
liberty, and demands a hearing, the court may easily avoid the constitutional
problem by finding the parolee really in custody. Facile shifting of the con
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parolee in a precarious position. He is not free to act as an ordinary
individual, and any improper action may result in reincarceration
with few of the procedural safeguards normally accorded those
charged with crime. 67
Although the .parolee' s exact status is uncertain, it is apparent
that he is not entirely free in the legal sense any more than on a
practical level. 'Each of the three theories accords the parolee less
than total freedom. The first two describe a liberty qualified by
certain conditions, the last contemplates a situation of continuing
custody. Several recent federal and state decisions emphasize the
legal restraints on freedom involved in parolee status. In Morrissey
v. Brewer68 the Supreme Court defined parole as "release from
prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that
the. prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sen
tence. "69 In Bricker v. Michigan Parole Board 70 it was held that
"parole is a form of custody whereby the prisoner leaves his place
of incarceration while remaining in the legal custody and control of
the Board of Parole until termination of his sentence."71 In People
v. Williams 72 it was stated that "[p]arole alters only the method
and degree of confinement during the period of commitment. "73
The court in People ex reI. Williams v. Morris 74 recognized that "a
parolee remains at all times in the legal custody of the Department
of Corrections and subject to the authority of the parole and par
don board until the expiration of his sentence. "75 The language of

cepts from liberty to custody and vice-versa has placed the judiciary and the
parolee in a position where neither is quite certain what parole means.
Parole, supra note 61, at 714-15 (footnotes omitted). See Gilchrist v. Overlade, 233
Ind. 569, 122 N.E.2d 93 (1954).
67. See note 99 infra.
68. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
69. [d. at 477.
70. 405 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
71. [d. at 1343.
72. 66 Ill. 2d 179,361 N.E.2d 1110 (1977).
73. [d. at 187, 361 N.E.2d at 1114. The case involved the question of whether
the Department of Corrections' statutory authorization for parole, furlough, work re
lease, day release, and other prison absence programs were an unconstitutional in
fringement upon the judiciary's power to impose sentences in criminal cases. The
court noted that, in a legal sense, parole does not alter a judicially imposed sentence
or in any other way affect it. [d.
74. 44 Ill. App. 3d 39, 357 N.E.2d 851 (1976).
75. [d. at 40, 357 N.E.2d at 852 (citation omitted). However, the ambiguity of
terms is demonstrated here as the court went on to hold that the praolee, although in
legal custody, was not under physical control and not in actual custody so that man
damus, rather than a writ of habeas corpus, was the proper remedy for petitioner to
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these decisions demonstrates that the parolee's freedom is legally
far more restricted than that of an ordinary citizen.
Within the framework of his or her ambiguous legal status, the
parolee's liberty is specifically restricted by the express conditions
of the parole agreement, which regulate the parolee's conduct upon
release. 76 Parole conditions can be grouped into two main types:
"reform" conditions, that urge the parolee toward a noncriminal
way of life, and "control" conditions, which enable the parole staff
to adequately supervise him. 77 The type of conditions imposed
often reflect the state's view of the function of parole. States that
emphasize the protection of the community impose extensive
parole conditions; those that stress rehabilitation impose a minimal
number of conditions. 78
The most prevalent conditions are those which regulate the
parolee's movements (including interstate travel), involvement in
criminal activities, drug abuse, association with undesirable com
panions, and possession of deadly weapons. 79 In addition, practi
cally every state has a statutory provision for "special conditions"
which allows the imposition of specific restrictions, such as prohibi
tion against contacting a former wife, traveling to a particular area,
or making overtures to the victims of the commitment offense. 80
It is evident that parole conditions have the ability to severely
restrict the parolee's freedom of action. The Supreme Court has
recognized that the conditions of parole restrict an individual's ac

compel the Department of Corrections to terminate his sentence. The court noted
that the position it took on parolee status was not universally accepted, and that a
review of other states shows that those jurisdictions have split on the issue of
whether the restraints imposed on a parolee are such as to enable him to maintain a
state habeas corpus action. See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 682 (1963).
76. The amount and nature of parole conditions vary by jurisdiction. The
number of conditions range from in excess of twenty in New Mexico to only four in
Washington. See D. STANLEY, supra note 61, at 82-83; L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at
171. Moreover, there is little consistency as to the nature of parole conditions.
"There are over fifty different parole rules in the nation's parole systems, yet not one
of the fifty is universally employed in every parole jurisdiction." L. CARNEY, supra
note 58, at 168 (citation omitted).
77. D. STANLEY, supra note 61, at 82-83.
78. L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 172.
79. Id. Other common restrictions include those on consuming alcoholic bever
ages, incurring indebtedness, entering into sales contracts, contracting a new mar
riage, driving or owning motor vehicles, changing employment or residence, and
supporting dependents. A parolee may also be required to observe curfews, avoid
prohibited places and associations, submit to home visitations by parole officers, and
file mandatory monthly reports. Parole, supra note 61, at 720-33.
80. L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 174.
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tivities substantially beyond the ordinary restrictions imposed by
law on the average citizen. 81 These restrictive conditions func
tion as a part of the parolee's punishment. 82 And, as indicated
above, compliance with these conditions is required for continued
parole. 83
A further restriction upon the parolee's freedom is the dis
cretionary manner in which parole conditions are enforced. " 'The
strictness with which parole rules are enforced varies greatly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending in part on the training of the
parole officer, but chiefly on the formal and informal policies of the
parole system.' "84 This discretionary enforcement may transform a
seemingly minor condition into a significant restriction. The Su
preme Court has noted that, because of this element of discretion,
even the most common provisions of a parole statute may result in
a significant restraint upon the parolee's freedom. "Even the condi
tion which requires [the parolee] not to violate any penal laws or
ordinances, at first blush innocuous, is a significant restraint be
cause it is the Parole Board members or the parole officer who
will determine whether such a violation has occurred. "85 Thus the
81. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478 (1972).
82. "The parolees are fully aware that parole is part of their punishment and
that they are 'paying their debt' by submitting to surveillance." D. STANLEY, supra
note 61, at 81 (footnote omitted).
83. The parole statutes generally grant the parole board great authority and dis
cretion, allowing them to prescribe strict standards of conduct for the parolee and to
reincarcerate for cause or on reasonable belief of a deviation. For example, the Ore
gon parole statute establishes the following general conditions of parole: The parolee
is to remain under the supervision of the Corrections Division and abide by its direc
tion, answer all reasonable inquiries, report to the parole officer as directed, and
respect and obey all local, state and federal laws. OR. REV. STAT. § 144.270(2) (1977).
The statute further provides that the board has the discretion to suspend or revoke
parole if it has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has violated these con
ditions or if it determines that the parole is not in the best interests of either the
parolee or society. let. § 144.331. The discretionary authority granted by the Ore
gon statutory scheme is representative of the parole statutes of most jurisdictions.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3053 (Deering 1971) (the Adult Authority has power to
impose "such conditions as it may deem proper" and revoke parole for non-··
compliance); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 133A (West 1974) (Parole Board may
grant a permit upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe and these terms
and conditions may be revised, altered, amended, or revoked by the board at any
time).
84. H. ABADINSKY, supra note 61, at 184 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
CRIME AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 69
( 1966)).
"[P]arole regulations are often petty and demeaning, 'or of such broad sweep
that they lend themselves to arbitrary and selective enforcement by parole officers.' "
[d. (quoting N.Y.S. SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA p. xix).
85. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 n.19 (1963).
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parole system, by its imposition of specific parole conditions,
coupled with discretionary enforcement and an ambiguous legal
status, restricts the freedom of the parolee in both a legal and a
practical sense.
Turning back to the possible reasons for the Court's failure to
address the parole issue,86 the first to be considered is that the
parolee status of the suspect has no bearing upon custody for
Miranda purposes. It is clear that parole has the ability to place
severe restraints on an individual's freedom of action. As the Court
applied an objective determination of custody stressing "depriva
tion of freedom of action in any significant way,"87 it cannot be said
that the parolee status of a suspect under supervision has no bear
ing upon custody.
The Supreme Court itself has recognized that the restrictions
imposed by the parole agreement may be sufficient to constitute
custody in certain circumstances. In Jones v. Cunningham 88 the
Court held that the petitioner, a parolee, was in the "custody" of
the Virginia Parole Board within the meaning of the federal habeas
corpus statute S9 because the parole order imposed conditions which
significantly confined the prisoner and restrained his freedom. This
restraint was deemed sufficient to maintain a federal habeas corpus
action. The Court based its decision upon the restraint on pe
titioner's liberty rather than on his actual physical custody.90 It
86.
87.

See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
See text accompanying note 39 supra.

88. 371 U.S. 236 (1963). Petitioner was a state prisoner sentenced as a recidivist
in Virginia. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in United States district court nam
ing the penitentiary superintendent as respondent and alleging that his third
offender sentence was based in part upon an invalid conviction. Shortly before the
appeal stage petitioner was paroled by the Virginia Parole Board under a parole
order which placed significant restrictions upon his liberty. Petitioner amended his
complaint to name the Virginia Parole Board as respondent.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970). This section gives the Supreme Court, district
court, and judges of the courts of appeals the power to grant a writ of habeas corpus
to anyone whose liberty is unlawfully restrained.
90. In a historical analysis the Court concluded that the remedy of habeas cor
pus is not restricted to situations where the petitioner is in actual custody. "While
petitioner's parole releases him from immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes
conditions which significantly confine and restrain his freedom; this is enough to
keep him in the 'custody' of the Virginia Parole Board within the meaning of the
habeas corpus statute. . . ." 371 U.S. at 243. Prior to this decision a majority of the
federal courts had held that after a prisoner is paroled he is no longer in custody and
hence the writ cannot lie. When the same issue was raised in a state proceeding, the
Appellate Court of Illinois noted that the Jones decision is only the interpretation of
a specific federal habeas corpus statute on a nonconstitutional basis, and thus, al
though persuasive authority, is not binding on the state courts. People ex rei. Wil
liams v. Morris, 44 Ill. App. 3d 39, 41, 357 N.E.2d 851, 853 (1976).
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noted that. the Virginia statute provides that a paroled prisoner
shall be released "into the custody of the Parole Board," and that
the parole order places the petitioner "under the custody and con
trol of the Virginia Parole Board. "91 The Court concluded that the
custody and control of the Parole Board significantly restrained the
petitioner's liberty to do those things which, in this country, free
people are entitled to do. 92
Although the Jones decision does not specifically define the
legal status of a parolee, it indicates that the courts need not con
fine themselves to the narrow definitions of "liberty" and "custody"
but may deal with parole as a matter of restraint. 93 Under this
analysis, parolee status is a proper subject for consideration in de
termining custody under an objective test because it does involve
"deprivation of freedom of action."
The suspect's parolee status is especially important for the
Miranda custody requirement when a station house interrogation
is involved. The most widely recognized theory of parole is the
Theory of Custody.94 If one accepts the basic premise of this
theory, that the parolee remains in "constructive custody" while
completing his sentence in the community, then an analogy is
clearly suggested between parolee status and prisoner status which
the Court has deemed to be custodial. In Mathis the Supreme
Court held that Miranda warnings are required in questioning tak
ing place in a prison setting during a suspect's term of imprison
ment on a separate offense. 95 It reasonably follows that the warn
ings should be required in questioning taking place in a station
house setting during a parolee's term of "constructive custody" on a
separate offense. 96

91. 371 U.S. at 241-42.
92. [d. at 242-43. The Court noted that:
[pjetitioner is confined by the parole order to a particular community, house,
and job at the sufference of his parole officer. He cannot drive a car without
permission. He must periodically report to his parole officer, permit the of
ficer to visit his home and job at any time, and follow the officer's advice.
He is admonished to keep good company and good hours, work regularly,
keep away from undesirable places, and live a clean, honest, and temperate
life.
[d. at 242.
93. Dealing with parole as a matter of restraint is a more accurate description of
the situation and avoids the problems raised by classifying the parolee within the
narrow definition of "liberty" or "custody." See note 65 supra.
94. See note 64 supra.
95. 391 U.S. at 4-5, accord, Hunt v. State, 2 Md. App. 443, 234 A.2d 785 (1967).
See Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 643 (1970).
96. The major difficulty with this type of theoretical analysis is that each of the
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On a practical level, the restraint upon liberty imposed by
parole is magnified in the coercive environment of a police station
interrogation. The real dangers which the Miranda decision was
designed to guard against are present here. 97 The parolee suspect,
because of his precarious position, may reasonably and realistically
feel compelled to remain and make statements which may ulti
mately prove incriminating. 98 Because any action he takes im
mediately jeopardizes his parole status,99 the parolee in this situa
tion has been obJectively deprived of his freedom of action in a
significant way. Station house interrogation transforms the so-called
"constructive custody" of the parolee into the equivalent of actual
custody for Miranda purposes. It places the individual in a coercive
atmosphere, it significantly restricts his freedom, and it may com
pel him to become a witness against himself.
The next possible reason for the Court's failure to address the
parolee status issue is the concern with creating real administrative
problems. If parolee status were to be recognized as a factor bearthree general theories of parole has been seriously criticized and none are uni
versally accepted. See notes 62-64 supra. Even courts which adhere to the Theory of
Custody often shift between the concepts of liberty and custody in order to deal with
particular parole problems. See note 66 supra.
97. Miranda was intended to protect the individual's privilege against self
incrimination by overcoming the dangers inherent in a police station interrogation.
See note 10 supra.
98. Realistically, knowledge of the interrogee's parolee status gives the police
interrogator a leverage in questioning this individual which is not present in the
interrogation of an ordinary suspect. The opportunity for police abuses in the course
of interrogation is much greater. The interrogator may compel the parolee suspect to
speak merely by threatening to inform the parole officer of an alleged violation. The
effect of deceptive police tactics, such as the officer's false statement in the instant
case about having found the defendant's fingerprints at the scene of the crime, will
have a greater impact on the parolee suspect and are more likely to create a realistic
belief in the individual's mind that he is not free to leave.
99. In Jones the Court observed:
[The parolee] must not only faithfully obey [all] restrictions and conditions
but he must live in constant fear that a single deviation, however slight,
might be enough to result in his being returned to prison ... with few, if
any, of the procedural safeguards that normally must be and are provided to
those charged with crime.
371 U.S. at 242 (footnote omitted).
Any action that the parolee may take carries with it serious implications. If he
attempts to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to talk or
leaves the interrogation, this may be deemed a sufficient basis, under the broad lan
guage of the parole statutes, for a revocation of his parole. If the parolee chooses to
remain and answer the questions, any admissions made in the course of interroga
tion, although insufficient to charge the ordinary suspect with a crime, may be suffi
cient to constitute a violation of parole and result in reincarceration. See note 83
supra.
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ing upon the Miranda custody requirement, many administrative
difficulties would ensue. Adequate evaluation of the effect of a sus
pect's parolee status in relation to "custody" would require a de
termination of: (1) The existence of the parolee status itself, (2) how
significantly the particular conditions of parole restrain this indi
vidual's freedom of action, and (3) whether this restraint is suffi
cient to constitute "custody" for Miranda purposes. These determi
nations would be difficult to make on a case-by-case basis.
Although parolee status is itself an objective criterion which
may easily be established,l0o difficult problems would be encoun
tered in making the other two determinations enumerated above.
The source of the difficulty is the individual nature of the parole
agreement. Each parolee may be subjected to a variety of indi
vidual parole conditions. 101 Moreover, the restrictive effect of a
particular condition will vary depending upon the jurisdiction's pol
icy of parole enforcement. 102 It would be a difficult task for a court
to determine the exact restrictive effect of a particular parole
agreement. This determination would be impossible for the inter
rogating officer to make at the time of the questioning. Even if the
Court were to set out formal guidelines, it would be difficult to
decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether the restrictive effect of the
particular parole conditions was sufficient to constitute a signficant
deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action.
Although concern over administrative difficulties is realistic,
this alone is an insufficient basis for the Court's avoidance of the
parolee status issue. As a general rule, administrative efficiency is
an inadequate justification for the denial of an individual's constitu
tional rights. 103 In addition, there is a simple alternative which can
eliminate, to a great extent, these administrative difficulties. In
light of the potential dangers inherent in the station house interro
gation of a parolee, and the great difficulties in making a case-by
case determination of the parole's restrictive effect, it would be
sensible for the Court to lay down a "blanket rule" requiring the
reading of Miranda rights prior to any station house interrogation
of a suspect known to be a parolee. 104 A blanket rule would elimi
100. In the instant case the interrogating officer was aware of the suspect's
parolee status prior to the interrogation. This status may just as easily be determined
by a si~ple question at the beginning of any interrogation.
101. See notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
103. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
104. Cf. People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468 (1972) (court laid down
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nate many of the problems inherent in the case-by-case determina
tion of custodial interrogation 105 and would adequately deal with
the nebulous quasi-custodial situation of parole. Administrative dif
ficulties would be few. The only necessary determinations would
be that the suspect is a parolee and the interrogation is taking
place at the station house. A blanket rule in this situation would be
closer to the "spirit" of Miranda 106 by providing meaningful protec
tion for the fifth amendment rights of this class of individuals. 107
The third possible reason for the Court's failure to address
the parolee status issue is the concern with raising numerous re
lated problems in other arguably custodial situations. This is the
strongest argument for the position taken by the Court. If parolee
status were to be recognized as a factor bearing upon custody, the
Court would then be forced to deal with similar conditional release
situations such as probation, prison furlough, work release, educa
tional release and other pre-sentence release programs. Each of
these situations contains elements similar to parolee status which
bear upon the freedom of action of the individual. 108 In each case,
the individual enjoys only a qualified liberty and is subject to some
aspect of control by the state. The dangers of "custodial interroga
tion" are present in some degree anytime one of these individuals
is subjected to station house interrogation. 109
blanket rule requiring Miranda warnings to be given all suspects who undergo
polygraph tests at the sheriff's office).
105. One commentator has noted that a police policy of automatically giving
Miranda warnings to any suspect of a station house interrogation would eliminate
many of the difficulties inherent in the determination of "custodial interrogation":
"[Plolice can easily identify what constitutes 'custodial interrogation' where that
concept is limited to questioning at the police station or a similar setting." Israel,
supra note 11, at 1384 (footnote omitted).
106. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968) (the avowed purpose of
Miranda is "to give meaningful protection to fifth amendment rights").
107. A blanket rule is only feasible in the context of a station house interroga
tion. There the interrogation proceeds at a more leisurely pace and the interrogating
officer can easily establish the suspect's parolee status and identify the proper point
at which the warnings must be given. General on-the-street or on-the-scene question
ing is not susceptible to such a blanket rule. It would be a great burden on police
officers to attempt to establish the possible parolee status of every individual with
whom they come in contact in the course of duty prior to asking them even the most
elementary questions.
108. Probation is the situation most analogous to that of parole. The basic dif
ference is that parole is a post-prison procedure while probation is a pre-prison pro
cedure. Probation has been justified under the same three theories used to justify
parole. H. ABADINSKY, supra note 61, at 130-31. It has also been noted that the condi
tions imposed on a probationer are markedly similar to those imposed upon a
parolee. ld. at 184.
109. See note 10 supra.
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To lay down one rule applicable to all of these varied situa
tions would be a difficult task. The source of the difficulty is the
dissimilarity of the various pre-release programs. Each jurisdiction
has developed its system independently, according to its own pol
icy and philosophy.110 The particular conditions of release and dis
cretion in revocation decisions vary greatlyl11 which makes it dif
ficult to promulgate a universal rule on this basis. However, the
Court could at least have dealt with the specific issue of "parolee
status" raised in Mathiason. Justice Stevens' dissent indicates that
the Court was aware of the particular problems raised by this is
sue. 112 The analogous problems of similar conditional release pro
grams could then be dealt with individually as they present them
selves to the Court.
In conclusion, the Mathiason Court adopted an objective de
termination of "custody" as the proper standard for application of
the Miranda principle, but ignored the suspect's parolee status in
making this determination. Since the restraints imposed by parole
significantly deprive an individual of his freedom, the issue merited
consideration. In view of the importance of the constitutionally
guaranteed rights involved,113 it is difficult to justify the Court's
decision to avoid dealing with the parolee status issue. Undoubt
edly, the Court will be required to face this issue again in the
future. 114 At that time the issue should receive the careful analysis
it deserves, rather than the cursory per curiam treatment afforded
by the Mathiason Court.

John J. Bogdanski
llO. See L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 148-52.
lli. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
112. See note 14 supra.
113. Miranda was intended to safeguard the individual's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444.
114. The issue of a station house interrogation of a parolee suspect will cer
tainly be raised again. It is not uncommon for an individual on parole to be interro
gated in relation to a recent crime. In'deed, it should be noted that, in the instant
case, Mathiason became implicated in the crime because he was a "parolee and
close associate" of the victim's son. See note 1 supra. As one commentator has noted,
"In fact, for obvious reasons, every parolee is likely to be re-arrested, when a crime
is committed in a small community and the perpetrator cannot be found im
mediately. He is the suspect per se and it is little to be wondered at his first being
arrested on suspicion." von Hentig, Degrees of Parole Violation and Graded Reme
dial Measures, 33 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363, 366-67 (1943) (footnote omitted).

